Twelve years of revolution in Rojava - a review

by Müslüm Örtülü, employee of Civaka Azad - Kurdish Center for Public Relations

The twelve-year history of the revolution in Rojava is a tale of war and resistance, of destruction and reconstruction, but above all of the implementation of an alternative, democratic and inclusive social system in the midst of a region characterized by numerous crises and hopelessness. This revolution has become a glimmer of hope for various peoples around the world, breaking with the prevailing system that favored war and oppression for over 100 years. In this article, we want to take a look back at how it all started.

The uprising in Rojava began on the night of July 18-19, 2012, when the people of Kobanê, together with the People's Defense Units (also known as the YPG/YPJ), drove Syrian soldiers out of the city and took control, which marked the culmination of a decade-long history of resistance. However, many see the uprising in Qamişlo in 2004 as the real starting point. Following a soccer match, tensions had escalated and led to nationwide protests, which had been bloodily suppressed by regime forces. These events intensified efforts to organize society and establish clandestine structures. The Kurds were no longer ready to accept the Syrian Baath regime's oppression of minorities.

The Democratic Unity Party (PYD) played a key role in these developments. Founded in 2003, it was based on Abdullah Öcalan's concept of democratic confederalism. Another crucial factor was the Kurdish women's umbrella organization Yekîtiya Star, which also organized itself underground and later became a pillar of the revolution. When the so-called Arab Spring reached Syria in March 2011, the previously secret council structures in Rojava appeared in public for the first time. The founding of the People's Self-Defense Units (YXG) soon followed. While the rest of Syria descended into civil war, the Kurdish regions remained comparatively calm. Syrian Kurdistan's population continued to organize itself, supported by the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), founded by members of the PYD.

The establishment of autonomy

The regime in Damascus observed the developments in Rojava closely, but ever-growing conflict in the rest of the country was, at least for the time being, prioritized. In order to appease the Kurds, the dictator Bashar al-Assad promised to grant citizenship, which they had been systematically denied up until then. The regime's sudden withdrawal allowed self-governing structures to gain control of three geographically separate “islands”, known as the cantons of Cizîrê, Kobanê and Efrîn, from mid-2012 onwards. Although these areas were not connected, TEV-DEM succeeded in establishing self-government in all three cantons and created a basis for coordination. By organizing under this common roof, society was able to maintain and develop vital infrastructure, with a constant supply of electricity and vital amounts of food among the early infrastructural achievements. But the revolution's core was represented by its council structures in districts and villages. TEV-DEM pushed for their establishment and pursued the goal of integrating all social components into the process.

The role of the Kurdish National Council and the “Third Way” policy

In addition to the PYD and TEV-DEM, numerous other Kurdish parties are active in Rojava, including around 20 that can be traced back to the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria. Some of these joined forces in 2011 to form the Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyeyê (ENKS, Kurdish National Council), but did not have the same influence as the PYD and TEV-DEM. The ENKS received international attention to a degree, but little support from the population. In Rojava, an attempt was made to bring all the Kurdish factions together, in part to prevent any possible influence by external forces. However, cooperation between TEV-DEM and ENKS was short-lived, mainly due to internal differences. The PYD rejected ENKS’ proposals to divide Rojava into two spheres of influence (as is the case in neighboring South Kurdistan). Some ENKS-affiliated parties later split off and became part of the self-administration, while others question the self-administration’s claim of inclusivity for all ethnic communities, especially Arabs, while the administration strives to integrate this group as well.

Similarly complicated is the relationship between Rojava and the main “Syrian opposition”. While activists in “Local Coordination Committees” were initially a driving force behind uprisings in other regions of Syria, political structures - mainly from exile - soon took the lead in fighting Baathists. The Syrian National Council, which met in Turkey and received support from Western countries and the Gulf states, was one of those political alliances. In Syria, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged as an armed organization that was not, however, subject to a unified command structure. Not unlike the regime, the so-called “Syrian opposition” pursued a hostile policy towards the Kurdish self-administration, mainly due to Turkey's influence, which considers the PYD a terrorist organization. Turkey’s ruling party, the AKP, initially tried to exert influence on Rojava, even inviting the PYD's co-chair, Salih Muslim, to official talks, but Muslim's efforts to convince Ankara of a neutral stance towards Rojava failed. In contrast, Turkey maintained favorable relations with the Kurdish parties of the ENKS, as it hoped that, in time, they would gain influence over the PYD in Rojava.

Meanwhile the self-administration agreed on a “third way” policy in order to avoid being drawn into the raging civil war. Building and protecting its own social system was of utmost importance. This strategy faced a new challenge after the Islamic State's famous attack on Kobanê during the autumn of 2014. The “third way” made Rojava less susceptible to external influences, but also meant no international support in the early years, unlike the “Syrian opposition”, which had more resources at its disposal.

Islamist terror reaches Rojava

In the course of the Syrian civil war, several Islamist groups gained increasing influence within the opposition, especially in its armed structures. The Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian National Council and other Islamist groups in the Free Syrian Army soon dominated. The Al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, openly emerged as an independent force in 2012, quickly followed by the Islamic State (IS) in 2013.

Initial attacks by jihadist groups on Rojava took place towards the end of 2012, including the Al-Nusra Front's assault on Serê Kaniyê. The successful resistance of the YPG/YPJ strengthened loyalties across the region, while the IS attacks on Kobanê and the heroic resistance of the Kurdish defense units brought Rojava to the attention of the Western media for the first time.

The fight for Kobanê as a key moment

Public interest and worldwide solidarity actions for Kobanê led to an international coalition stepping in to help the city's defenders in their fight against IS. Due to wide-ranging public pressure, a US-led international coalition was ultimately forced to intervene by attacking IS positions in northern Syria by air, supporting YPG/YPJ boots on the ground.

After the victory in Kobanê, coalition forces continued cooperation with Kurdish organizations to liberate further cities. The Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) were established, under whose umbrella various Arab militias came together, alongside YPG/YPJ units. The QSD liberated cities such as Minbic and Raqqa, essential steps leading to the complete destruction of IS territorial rule in Syria in March 2019.

Turkey intervenes

Despite the fight against IS, the AKP cabinet continued to pursue a hostile stance towards the self-administration and repeatedly intervened in the Syrian conflict, starting in 2016. Operation “Protective Shield Euphrates” intended to prevent the Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) from taking control of further areas. In January 2018, Turkey launched “Operation Olive Branch”, aimed directly at the self-administration in the canton of Efrîn. The offensive led to the expulsion of YPG/YPJ units as well as mass displacements of the population, and also the resettlement of Arab refugees in the city itself. Islamist factions, including former IS fighters, took part in the occupation.

Another military offensive, cynically named “Operation Peace Spring”, followed in October 2019. Turkey and its allies occupied areas between the towns of Serê Kaniyê and Girê Spî in northern Syria, forcing more than 200,000 people to flee, while approximately 450 civilians lost their lives. These interventions continue to threaten Rojava and jeopardize any effort to build democratic confederalism to this day.

Ongoing threat and destruction of infrastructure

Since October 2023, Turkish armed forces have destroyed large parts of the civilian infrastructure of North and East Syria in several waves of attacks. The people in the region are being deprived of their livelihoods, with the international community remaining silent about these massive war crimes. The attacks in January 2024 left around two million people without electricity, with the destruction of energy supplies also affecting the availability of drinking water. Fuel shortages pose a significant risk to humanitarian aid, affecting the mobility of personnel, transportation of vital goods and the functioning of life-saving health facilities as well as medical equipment. In spring, militias loyal to Turkey began to bomb agricultural areas in a targeted manner, their attacks aiming to disrupt the population's self-sufficiency in wheat and other grains. While Turkey is threatening to conduct further military offensives across the border, it also pursues a strategy of attrition in order to destroy the population’s livelihoods, causing many to flee.

Development in progress

Despite threats, Rojava continues to build social structures. Following the establishment of self-governing structures in Cizîrê, Kobanê and Efrîn, a transitional government was created in November 2013, coordinating between the three cantons. This led to the proclamation of the “Autonomous Administration of Rojava” and the adoption of the first social contract. Following the expansion of the fight against IS to predominantly Arab areas, the Syrian Democratic Council (MSD) was founded, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious structure that strives for a democratic post-war order for Syria. The name change to the “Democratic Federation of North and East Syria” in December 2016 emphasized this new perspective.

With IS rule dismantled, self-administration was reformed once again. The “Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria” was proclaimed and self-governing areas divided into seven regions. The aim was now to build up the council structures and to widen the social model to a population newly liberated from IS. This process lasted until December 2023, when the latest version of the social contract was finally ratified.

“It [the social contract] was implemented with the consent of all segments of society and with the participation of representatives of all institutions, organizations, religions, denominations and peoples. It was unacceptable for only one national identity to prevail and for other nations to remain in a minority position. The social contract secured the rights of different ethnic, religious and confessional identities.” (Stêr Bişar Qasim, member of the Women's Council of North and East Syria). Stêr Bişar Qasim was part of the committee responsible for drafting the contract before its ratification. The intensive negotiation phase of its content led, among other things, to a reform of the regional organization in the form of cantons. Those of Cizîrê, Firat, Raqqa, Tabqa, Deir ez-Zor, Minbic and Efrîn-Şehba are the result. It is also intended to represent a blueprint for a future, decentralized and democratic Syria as a whole, as she emphasizes: “We are creating a model that is far removed from an autocratic system. The results of the centralized system in Syria are right in front of our eyes. The rights of various ethnic, religious and confessional identities were violated. For this reason, we have named the Syrian Democratic Republic as our goal, both in our discussions and in this contract.”