A Secure Future for Christians and Other Minorities in North and East Syria

Foundation for multi-ethnic and multi-religious inclusion created

Rojava Information Center (RIC)

The population in North and East Syria is characterized by religious and ethnic diversity. It is an important task of society and the self-administration to enable equal coexistence, which requires a continuous process of negotiation. We publish an excerpt on this topic from a report by the Rojava Information Center (RIC) from September 2020.

Civil and Political Conflicts

Criticism of the self-administration of North and East Syria's handling of relations among the various ethnic and religious groups has understandably focused on relations between Kurds and Arabs, by far the largest ethnic groups in the region. Within the political spectrum of opinion in North and East Syria, the very conservative Arab communities in the regions liberated from the "Islamic State" (IS) represent the political antithesis to the Kurdish communities in Jazirah. The majority of these have long supported the political program of self-administration. In the Arab communities, their political program meets with great opposition. These tensions have been extensively documented and discussed elsewhere and will be the focus of RIC's next report.

The attitude of Christians and other minorities toward the political project in the northeast was neutral or mostly positive. In particular, representatives of traditionally marginalized groups such as Ezidis and Alevis reported only positive things about the steps taken in recent years to involve them in local and regional politics.

Assyrian Democratic Party (ADP) - A Practical Example

ADP officials describe the relationship between the ADP and the self-administration as largely positive, but also clouded by disputes related to the Syrian Assyrian Military Council. The two co-chairs of the military council are married to each other and this is not accepted by the self-administration. ADP representatives tell RIC that the administration has been inflexible on this issue and has not recognized that it is difficult for the small and traditional Assyrian community to find women for leadership positions, as required by gender equality policy. The proposed solution by a group within the ADP to remove the couple from their position and make them ordinary members was not accepted by all members of the council. As a result, the head of the Assyrian office was removed from his position. In addition, there were complaints from official representatives about the lack of financial support from the self-administration for the ADP.

Outside the military sphere, the main criticism concerns school curricula. In 2018, the self-administration attempted to impose its own curriculum in private and Syrian government-funded Syrian schools. These were still teaching according to a Damascus-approved curriculum. This led to tensions with the school authorities of the government in Damascus. In September 2018, an agreement was reached between the self-government and the local Syriac Orthodox archdiocese: the first two grades in these schools will be taught according to the self-administration curriculum, and grades three through six will continue to be taught according to the Damascus-influenced curriculum. In its own public school system, the self-administration continues to offer mother-tongue instruction in Syriac for Syrian children and also Syriac as a second language for Arab, Kurdish, and other students.

Complaints about the self-administrations's use of property belonging to Christians who had fled were resolved, to the satisfaction of all parties interviewed by RIC, by the introduction of a special law that establishes special protection for Christians' homes, property and land until their return. This process is overseen by a specially established committee of local Christians.

In general, the relationship between the Christian communities and the self-administration is characterized by enthusiastic engagement in some neighborhoods and cautious distance in others.

Hevin Aisa of the Armenian Council told RIC that the Armenian population has so far tended to stay away from the self-administration: "This is because they fear the regime's repression. For this reason, the Armenian Council stays away from politics. Some of its members are closer to the regime and others to the self-administration."

This formulation, which is open to both sides, is typical of civil society activists who maintain relations with the self-administration and, at the same time, with individuals and institutions close to Damascus. The attitudes of the Christian community in Qamişlo (and to a lesser extent in Hesekê) also differ significantly from those of the communities in the Khabour Valley, Til Temir, Dêrik and Tirbesipiyê. In Qamişlo, Damascus has maintained control over some Christian neighborhoods throughout the war, and the community accordingly continues to seek protection in Damascus. The communities in the Khabour Valley, Til Temir, Dêrik and Tirbesipiyê have joined the political project in the northeast with more enthusiasm.

Current Threats

Turkey's 2018 invasion and subsequent occupation of Efrîn demonstrate the threat that further invasions pose to minorities in North and East Syria. The population of the Efrîn region was approximately 95% Kurdish with large Alevi and Ezidi minorities and smaller Armenian, Arab, and Nawar communities. Compared to other Kurdish areas within Syria's borders, Efrîn was much more homogeneously Kurdish, both ethnically and linguistically.

Today, the majority of Christians and Ezidis have been forcibly displaced from Efrîn and live either in refugee camps in the Şehba region or in other Syrian cities. The remaining minorities in Efrîn have been publicly threatened with death or forced conversion by Turkish-controlled radical Islamist militias – a threat that had to be taken seriously.

The Turkish-led "demographic engineering" in Efrîn is well documented. Briefly summarized, these are processes of:
- Arabization (the settlement of Arab militiamen from other parts of Syria and their families in formerly Kurdish, Ezidi, Christian and Alevi towns and regions)
- Turkification (via the introduction of a Turkish curriculum in schools, the renaming of buildings and official structures, the establishment of de facto Turkish control over all aspects of government and civil society)
- Islamization (via the school curriculum and through the violence of Turkish-controlled armed groups)
- the establishment of a "Turkmen belt" along the border with Turkey.

On October 9, 2019, Turkey again attacked border towns across North and East Syria to occupy the towns of Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî and the surrounding countryside. In the first few days, dozens of towns and villages came under fire. A number of predominantly Christian enclaves were attacked, including villages around Dêrik and the Christian neighborhood of Bişeriye in Qamişlo. These attacks occurred even though these enclaves are far from the region Turkey wanted to occupy. Christian residents were injured and killed in these attacks.

The Turkish invasion enabled the sleeper cells of the so-called Islamic State (IS) to intensify their activities. Consequently, attacks against general targets and against religious minorities increased significantly since the beginning of the operation. Attacks by sleeper cells fell to a record low in September 2019 (43 attacks), but increased again after the Turkish invasion in October 2019. In November and December, 83 and 84 attacks were recorded, respectively. In November 2019, the killing of Armenian priest Housib Petoyan and his father by IS while they were traveling to Deir ez-Zor to work on the restoration of the Armenian church there drew particular attention.

The Christian community had been targeted by IS even before the Turkish invasion, most recently in a car bomb attack in July 2019. But IS alone is not the only one carrying out attacks with sleeper cells in the northeast: Car bombings of churches, e.g., in Qamişlo with five civilians dead during the Turkish "Spring Peace Offensive", point to the involvement of Turkish-backed sleeper cells.

Prospects for the Future

The political project in the northeast undoubtedly offers ethnic and religious minorities opportunities not afforded to them anywhere else in the Middle East in terms of guaranteed political representation, protection and the promotion of their cultural rights. The political system of North and East Syria lays a foundation for multi-ethnic and multi-religious inclusion, although work remains to be done to ensure that the reality lives up to this claim. We were able to speak with a wide range of political actors from religious and ethnic minorities, at the community level to the highest levels of the administration. Since many of these groups, like the Kurds, have also experienced historical marginalization, they are united by their shared concerns and interests arising from the historical changes in the northeast.

This article was first published in the September/October 2021 edition of the Kurdistan Report.